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DURHAM, N.H. – Landmark regulations designed to detect and deter financial fraud via
anonymous whistle-blowers can be dysfunctional and ineffective, according to new
research from the University of Hampshire.
In the first study to investigate the effects of anonymous reporting channels and
reputation threats on investigations of whistle-blowing allegations, Jacob Rose, associate
professor of accounting at UNH, and co-author James Hunton, the Darald and Juliet Libby
Professor of Accounting of Bentley College, find there are disturbing unintended
consequences of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, which requires audit committees of
publicly traded firms provide an anonymous whistle-blowing channel to employees in
order to detect and deter financial fraud and to protect whistle-blowers from persecution.
The research is published online and will appear in print in the Journal of Management
Studies in the article, “Effects of Anonymous Whistle-Blowing & Perceived Reputation
Threats On Investigations of Whistle-Blowing Allegations by Audit Committee Members.”
The study is based on an experiment in which 83 highly experienced audit committee
members evaluated the credibility of a whistle-blowing allegation related to financial
reporting malfeasance by corporate executive officers and allocated resources toward the
investigation of the whistle-blowing allegation.
The researchers find that audit committee members can fail to sufficiently investigate
whistle-blowing allegations received through anonymous whistle-blowing channels relative
to non-anonymous channels, especially when the allegations pose reputation threats to
the corporate directors.
“We concluded that audit committee members who evaluate whistle-blowing allegations
and determine whether or not allegations should be investigated treat anonymous and
non-anonymous allegations very differently. Audit committee members find anonymous
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allegations to be less credible than non-anonymous allegations. As a result, audit
committee members often choose not to investigate an anonymous allegation, even when
the allegation indicates very serious threats to the integrity of the financial reporting
system. When an identical allegation is not anonymous, audit committees allocate
significant resources to the investigation of the allegation. In brief, anonymous allegations
appear to be ignored in many cases,” Rose said.
“What is particularly disturbing, however, is that we also find evidence that reputation
threats faced by corporate directors have significant influences on decisions to investigate
allegations. We find that when an allegation poses threats to a director’s professional
reputation, a form of predecisional distortion of information occurs. Essentially, when audit
committee members recognize that an allegation threatens their reputations, they have
incentives to not investigate the allegation. These incentives cause the audit committee
members to perceive that the allegation is less credible, which provides justification for
deciding not to investigate the allegation,” Rose said.
“The data indicate that reputation threats can create conflicts of interest, and directors
appear to favor personal reputations over obligations to oversee financial reporting
quality. Results suggest that anonymous reporting channels provide directors with a way
to rationalize decisions to ignore allegations by ascribing low credibility to anonymous
allegations that pose reputation threats. Regulators and shareholders currently rely on
anonymous whistle-blowing systems to prevent and detect financial statement fraud. Our
findings call into question whether anonymous whistle-blowing actually improves
corporate governance,” he said.
The researchers believe substantial changes must be made regarding who evaluates
whistle-blowing allegations.
“The effectiveness of whistle-blowing mechanisms is critical for the prevention of financial
statement fraud. We believe that it is now essential to determine who should be charged
with evaluating anonymous allegations. If we want whistle-blowing mechanisms to be
effective, then shareholders, regulators, and academics need to identify an independent
third party who can determine the veracity of allegations without being influenced by
reputation threats,” Rose said.
Jacob Rose is an associate professor at the University of New Hampshire Whittemore
School of Business and Economics. He conducts experimental research related to
judgment and decision-making in the contexts of corporate governance, auditing, and
accounting. He has published psychology-based studies in a wide variety of academic
journals and holds a Ph.D. from Texas A&M University.
The UNH Whittemore School of Business and Economics offers a full complement of highquality programs in business, economics, accounting, finance, marketing, and hospitality
management. Programs are offered at the undergraduate, graduate, and executive
development levels. The school is accredited by the Association to Advance Collegiate
Schools of Business, the premier accrediting agency for business schools worldwide. For
more information, visit http://wsbe2.unh.edu/.
The University of New Hampshire, founded in 1866, is a world-class public research
university with the feel of a New England liberal arts college. A land, sea, and space-grant
university, UNH is the state's flagship public institution, enrolling more than 12,200
undergraduate and 2,200 graduate students.
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